The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multi-faceted Law of the Sea Case with a Human Rights Dimension by Oude Elferink, Alexander G.
1 
 
The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multifaceted law of the sea case with a human rights 
dimension  
 
Alex G. Oude Elferink* 
Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea 
School of Law, Utrecht University, The Netherlands 
and 
K.G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea 
University of Tromsø, Norway 
 
 
                                                 
* This article is an expanded and updated version of the post The Arctic Sunrise Incident and the International 
Law of the Sea (uit.no/Content/362359/The%20Arctic%20Sunrise%20Incident%20and%20ITLOS_final.pdf). I 
would like thank my colleagues of the section of International and European Law of the School of Law of 
Utrecht University for sharing their views on this post during a staff seminar on 16 January 2014 and Erik 
Molenaar and Seline Trevisanut for their comments on the post and the possibility to discuss various issues. I 
also would like to thank Daniel Simons and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on the draft of this 





The Arctic in recent years has been the scene of increased efforts to exploit offshore oil and 
gas resources. All Arctic Ocean coastal states – Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, the 
Russian Federation and the United States have been granting oil companies licenses to operate 
in their Arctic waters. The risk oil spill incidents pose to the fragile Arctic ecosystem has led 
to strong opposition to these activities from environmentalists. Both the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) and Greenpeace International have called for a moratorium on offshore activities in 
the Arctic.1 Greenpeace International in this connection has been targeting the activities of oil 
companies in Arctic waters. On 18 September 2013, during one of these actions involving the 
vessel Arctic Sunrise Greenpeace activists tried to access the rig Prirazlomnaya, which was 
operating within the Russian Federation’s exclusive economic zone in the Pechora Sea 
between the Russian mainland and Novaya Zemlya. The following day the Russian authorities 
boarded and arrested the Arctic Sunrise and detained its crew. The vessel and crew were 
subsequently transferred to the Russian port of Murmansk and the crew was charged with 
various offenses. The detention of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew prompted the immediate 
reaction of its flag state, the Netherlands. The Netherlands informed the Russian Federation 
that it considered that through the detention of the Arctic Sunrise the Russian Federation had 
breached its obligations towards the Netherlands as the flag state of the Arctic Sunrise.2  
According to the Netherlands the vessel when boarded was exercising the freedom of 
navigation guaranteed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),3 to 
which the Netherlands and the Russian Federation are both parties.4 The Dutch position is 
based on the premise that only the Netherlands as the flag state was entitled to take 
enforcement action against the Arctic Sunrise and that the Russian authorities could only have 
boarded the vessel with its consent.5  
 
After diplomatic contacts between the Netherlands and the Russian Federation failed to 
resolve the issue, the Netherlands, on 4 October 2013, commenced an arbitration against the 
Russian Federation under the LOSC.6 The Netherlands requested a determination that the 
arrest and detention of the Arctic Sunrise without its prior consent were illegal under 
international law. In reply, the Russian Federation informed the Netherlands that it did not 
accept the arbitration procedure, invoking a declaration it had made in becoming a party to the 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Cairn discovery poses grave threat to climate and the Arctic  
(www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/Cairn-discovery-poses-grave-threat-to-climate-and-the-
Arctic/); WWF calls for moratorium on oil exploration in the Arctic (wwf.panda.org/?122040/WWF-calls-for-
moratorium-on-oil-exploration-in-the-Arctic). 
2 See Submission of dispute to arbitration ‘Arctic Sunrise’; The Kingdom of the Netherlands v. The Russian 
Federation, dated 4 October 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.
pdf at p. 15), paras 1 and 4. 
3 Adopted on 10 December 1982; 1833 UNTS 3. 
4 Ibid., para. 5. 
5 See note MinBuza.2013.274797 of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the Russian 
Federation in The Hague of 29 September 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.
pdf, at p. 39).  




LOSC.7 On 21 October 2013 the Netherland requested provisional measures from the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg.8 The relief requested 
included the immediate release of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew by the Russian authorities.9 
Consistent with its position on the arbitration, the Russian Federation informed the ITLOS 
that it did not intend to participate in the proceedings for the prescription of provisional 
measures.10 The proceedings went ahead without the participation of the Russian Federation 
and the ITLOS rendered its decision on 22 November 2013.11 The Tribunal’s order to a large 
extent granted the measures requested by the Netherlands.  
 
The present article looks at the issues of international law raised by the arrest of the Arctic 
Sunrise and the arbitration initiated by the Netherlands.12 It will first of all provide an 
overview of the events leading up to the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew, after which 
the Dutch and Russian positions on the applicable legal framework will be discussed. This is 
followed by two sections looking respectively at the law of the sea and human rights 
dimension of the incident. The latter framework is essential for assessing the kind of measures 
a coastal state may take in its exclusive economic zone against protest actions. Providing 
sufficient room for the freedom of expression may limit the scope of action that might 
otherwise exist. These two legal frameworks are combined in a subsequent section. A final 
part of the article looks at the arbitration initiated by the Netherlands and the order of the 
ITLOS on provisional measures. This is followed by concluding remarks of a general nature. 
 
The events leading up to the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew 
In 2010 Greenpeace started the campaign “Save the Arctic”. In the course of this campaign 
Greenpeace has carried out a number of actions directed at oil and gas activities in the 
maritime zones of the Russian Federation.13 This resulted in several incidents involving the 
                                                 
7 Note no. 11945 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Dutch Embassy in Moscow 
of 22 October 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Note_verbale_Russian_Federation_eng.pdf); 
Declaration of the Russian Federation upon ratification of the LOSC on 12 March 1997 (English text available at 
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm. On this point see further below text 
at note 156157 and following. 
8 Request for the prescription of provisional measures under article 290, paragraph 5, of the United Nations 
Convention on the law of the sea, dated 21 October 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.
pdf). 
9 Ibid., para. 47. 
10 Note 3838/N of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Berlin to the ITLOS of 22 October 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Note_verbale_Russian_Federation_eng.pdf ). 
11 ITLOS, Order of 22 November 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Order/C22_Ord_22_11_2013_orig_Eng.pdf).  
12 The article does not deal with questions concerning the legislation of the Russian Federation that are relevant 
to arrest and detention of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew. 
13 See Letter of the Agent for the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Registrar of the International Law of the 
Sea of 7 November 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Response_questions_en.pdf), attachment Arctic 
Sunrise, Case No. 22, Replies to questions from the Tribunal; Reply to question 1. This reply refers to actions 
against the Prirazlomnaya in August 2012 and 2013 in the Barents Sea and against activities of Rosneft and 




Arctic Sunrise and the Russian authorities. According to a spokesperson of the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands as the flag state of the Arctic Sunrise was asked 
on more than one occasion to stop the activities of the vessel, but this did not have any 
results.14 When asked about these incidents by the ITLOS, the Netherlands indicated that they 
had been assessed by the Netherlands Shipping Inspectorate. As far as can be ascertained, the 
Netherlands did not take any action in relation to the Arctic Sunrise following these 
incidents.15 While the Arctic Sunrise was in the Kara Sea in August 2013, the ship was 
reportedly inspected by the Russian authorities and it was informed that force would be used 
against it if it would not leave the area.16 The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought this 
latter incident to the attention of the Russian Embassy in The Hague and in that connection 
protested the threat of use of force and pointed out that the Russian Federation should have 
obtained permission for the inspection from the Netherlands as the flag state of the Arctic 
Sunrise.17  
 
After a further action of the Arctic Sunrise directed at the rig Prirazlomnaya operated by 
Gazprom on 18 September 2013, the vessel was arrested the next day by the Russian Coast 
Guard. The Prirazlomnaya at this time was stationed in the Pechora Sea in the southeastern 
part of the Barents Sea in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation. The rig was 
intended to start producing oil before the end of 2013. This would make the rig the first 
offshore producing unit in the Arctic.18 That target date was actually met.19 
                                                 
14 See BBC Russkaya Sluzhba Rossiya raskritikovala Gollandiyu iz-za sudna “Grinpis” 
(www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2013/10/131005_russia_netherlands_greenpeace_reaction.shtml); see also 
note No. 10344/1 edn of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Dutch Embassy in 
Moscow of 18 September 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.
pdf, at p. 32), and Letter, note 13, at Reply to question 1. In commenting on the Order of ITLOS of 22 November 
2013, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed the hope that the Tribunal would look objectively at the 
case, taking into account all of its aspects, including the non-fulfilment of the Netherlands of its obligation as the 
flag state of the Arctic Sunrise (Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s 
resheniem Mezhdunarodnogo tribunala po morskomu pravu  o vremennykh merakh po delu “Arktik Sanraiz” 
(www.mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/4B386118B88DE72A44257C2B00537563?OpenDocument).  
15 See BBC Russkaya Sluzhba, note 14; see also Letter, note 13, at Reply to question 1. 
16 See Vragen gesteld door de leden der Kamer, met de daarop door de regering gegeven antwoorden 
Parliamentary papers 2013-2014, Appendix to the proceedings no. 136 
(https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20132014-136.pdf), answer to question 1. This concerns 
questions submitted by Members of Parliament on 28 August 2013 and an answer submitted by the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs on 2 October 2013. 
17 Vragen, note 16 at answer to question 4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in his answers also discussed the 
refusal of the Russian authorities to give the Arctic Sunrise access to the Northern Sea Route, the navigational 
route along the northern coast of the Russian Federation and administered by it. The Minister acknowledged that 
article 234 of the LOSC entitled the Russian Federation to take certain measures but that it did not imply an 
unfettered right to limit the freedom of navigation. The Russian authorities had refused access to the Northern 
Sea Route because Greenpeace had provided incomplete information on the technical specifications of the Arctic 
Sunrise. The Minister indicated that the vessel had the second to highest ice classification, which was more than 
sufficient to undertake the planned voyage and that there were no grounds to doubt the technical status of the 
vessel (ibid., answers to questions 3and 4). 
18 Greenpeace International Statement of facts concerning the Boarding and  Detention of the MY Arctic Sunrise 
and the judicial proceedings against all persons on board 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.





 A detailed account of the events leading up to the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew has 
been prepared by Greenpeace International.20 A Russian view on the unfolding of events can 
be gleaned, in a rather cursory form, from a judgment of 8 October 2013 in an administrative 
procedure against the master of the Arctic Sunrise.21 The account of events prepared by 
Greenpeace International, also broaches the purpose of its action against the Prirazlomnaya. 
Before the action started, the rig was informed of the purpose and peaceful nature of the 
action.22 The account also indicates that the two protesters who climbed the outside structure 
of the rig intended to unfurl a banner some distance beneath the main deck and that it was 
intended to put a safety pod on the structure that would allow climbers to hide from the 
elements and fire hoses.23 The suggestion that this pod was intended to allow a longer stay is 
confirmed by a statement of Faiza Oulahsen, one of the activists, after her return to the 
Netherlands from her detention in the Russian Federation: 
Our plan was to stop the platform for a certain time. If you place climbers on it – 
unauthorized personnel – you are able to shut down such a platform for a week or 
three in a safe and effective manner. Then you put Gazprom under pressure. They lose 
income. And you scare of other investors.24 
 
On 16 September 2013, the Russian Federation’s Coast Guard vessel Ladoga warned the crew 
of the Arctic Sunrise over the radio that an infringement of the provisions of the LOSC for the 
protection of the safety of shipping in the vicinity of the Prirazlomnaya would not be 
tolerated. On the following day, when the Arctic Sunrise changed course towards the 
Prirazlomnaya, the Ladoga again communicated over the radio that regulations had to be 
complied with and that it was not permitted to enter the area with a radius of 3 nautical miles 
around the rig where there was a danger to shipping and the 500-meter safety zone around the 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 “Gazprom nachal dobychu nefti na platforme “Prirazlomnaya” s 10-letnim opozdaniem” of 20 December 2013 
(www.newsru.com/russia/20dec2013/gazprom.html. 
20 This account is annexed to the Netherlands’ application instituting the arbitration under the LOSC 
(Greenpeace International, note 18). 
21 Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation; Coast Guard Division for Murmansk Oblast; judgment in 
the case concerning an administrative offence no. 2109/623-13 of 8 October 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.
pdf, at pp. 103 and 111). 
22 Greenpeace International, note 18, para. 12. The account does not indicate in what terms the purpose of the 
actions was communicated to the Prirazlomnaya. 
23 Ibid., paras 13-14. 
24 Y. Aboutaleb and J. van der Kris “In de cel voel je je echt geen held; Interview Faiza Oulahsen” NRC 
Weekend, 4 and 5 January 2014, pp. 6-7 at p. 6 (translation from Dutch by the author). According to Daniel 
Simons, Legal Counsel Campaigns and Actions of Greenpeace International, the statement of Ms. Oulahsen was 
correctly conveyed by the newspaper, but he added that in general this kind of protest would be ended rapidly, 
either by the authorities or through summary proceedings in a civil case (e-mail of D. Simons to the author of 17 
January 2014). Information Greenpeace provided to the Netherlands and that was used by the Netherlands in 
answering a question from the ITLOS suggests a much more limited purpose of the action. According to this 
Dutch reply, Greenpeace had decided to allow volunteers to enter the safety zone and two climbers to attach a 
small banner to the exterior of the platform (Arctic Sunrise Case, Case no. 22; Replies to questions from the 
Tribunal (www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Response_questions_en.pdf), Reply to a 




rig.25 The next day, the Arctic Sunrise launched 5 boats near the perimeter of the 3-nautical-
mile zone that moved in the direction of the Prirazlomnaya. Three of the boats were carrying 
a large object with them. According to Greenpeace this safety pod was intended to hang from 
the side of the rig and offer shelter to Greenpeace activists. There is no indication the Arctic 
Sunrise itself at any time entered the safety zone around the rig, but it did enter the 3-nautical-
mile zone at one point. A number of persons attempted to board the Prirazlomnaya from the 
boats launched by the Arctic Sunrise and two of them were arrested by the Russian Coast 
Guard. During the attempt to scale the rig, fire hoses were used by persons on the rig and 
warning shots were fired into the water near the boats.26  
 
The accounts of the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise differ. The Russian judgment of 8 October 
2013 indicates that the master of the vessel was instructed to stop and allow an inspection by 
the Coast Guard following the actions of the boats of the Arctic Sunrise directed at the 
Prirazlomnaya. This order was given over an hour after the last reported incident at the rig 
took place. The judgment further notes that this order and subsequent orders were not obeyed 
by the master of the Arctic Sunrise and that “[e]ventually the Arctic Sunrise was forced to 
stop for inspection on 19 September 2013”.27 After the Arctic Sunrise  was first ordered to 
stop for boarding the Ladoga fired 11 warning shots and subsequently communicated that it 
would open fire on the ship if it did not allow boarding, adding that any casualties would be 
the responsibility of Greenpeace.28 The accounts of the incident indicate that no firing at the 
Arctic Sunrise actually took place.  
 
The account by Greenpeace suggests an even longer gap between the last reported incident 
and the order to the master of the Arctic Sunrise to stop for boarding. It reports subsequent 
negotiations between the Ladoga and the Arctic Sunrise in which release of the arrested 
activists was offered in return for allowing voluntary inspection of the Arctic Sunrise by the 
Coast Guard.29 Later the Ladoga ordered the Arctic Sunrise to move away from the 
Prirazlomnaya, suggesting that this was a condition for discussing the transfer of the arrested 
                                                 
25 Article 16 of the Federal Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation, adopted on 25 October 1995 
provides for the establishment of safety zones around installations not extending beyond 500 meters (English 
text available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1995_Law.pdf). The language 
employed suggests that such a safety zone is automatically established. Article 16 does require that the 
competent authorities determine the measures that shall apply in the safety zone and that these shall be published 
in the Notices to Mariners. A review of the Notices to Mariners on a website of the Hydrographic Office of the 
Russian Navy (http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/hydrographic/esim.htm?f=51&blk=10375815) on the 
specific measures applicable to the safety zone of the Prirazlomnaya did not yield any results. The Federal Law 
does not provide for the possibility of a 3-nautical-mile zone. On a prior occasion a 3-nautical-mile safety zone 
around the Prirazlomnaya had been notified through the Notices to Mariners (Izveshcheniya Moreplavatelyam, 
No. 6618-6774 of 10 December 2011 (http://structure.mil.ru/files/morf/military/files/NM1151.PDF), p. 7. 
26 Greenpeace International, note 18, paras 11-17; on the latter point see also note No. 10344/1 edn, note 14 at p. 
2. 
27 Judgment of 8 October 2013, note 21 at p. 5. 
28 Greenpeace International, note 18, at paras 22 and 25; the former points are also mentioned in note No. 
10344/1, note 14 at p. 2. 




activists.30 After the Arctic Sunrise moved away from the rig nothing happened and the vessel 
subsequently moved back within a distance of five nautical miles of the rig. At no time did the 
Arctic Sunrise move back into the 3-nautical-mile zone around the rig. The boarding of the 
Arctic Sunrise took place the next day from a helicopter by armed government officials.31  
 
The Dutch and Russian positions on the applicable legal framework 
The Russian Federation has invoked a number of grounds to justify its actions against the 
Arctic Sunrise. The Russian Coast Guard initially justified its order to the master of the Arctic 
Sunrise to stop and allow an inspection by referring to the fact that the actions of the vessel 
and its boats constituted terrorism.32 A Russian diplomatic note of 18 September 201333 relied 
on the same grounds, while a court order of 7 October 2013 of a Russian district court 
concerning the seizure of the Arctic Sunrise referred to the provisions on piracy contained in 
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas34 to which the Russian Federation and the Netherlands 
are parties.35 The order concluded that the Russian Coast Guard took control of the Arctic 
Sunrise in accordance with the Convention on the High Seas “since there was a reasonable 
suspicion that the ship was engaged in piracy.”36 The order also pointed out that the 
documents that had been submitted indicated that the crew of the Arctic Sunrise had attacked 
the Prirazlomnaya, using threats of violence and using objects as weapons, with the aim of 
taking possession of property belonging to another person.37 Finally, the judgment of 8 
October by a Coast Guard official and a Russian diplomatic note of 1 October 2013 invoked 
articles 56 and 60 of the LOSC as a basis for the Russian action.38 
 
The Dutch view on the relevant legal framework is based in article 58 of the LOSC, which 
refers to the freedom of navigation of all states in the exclusive economic zone of the coastal 
state. Ships exercising the freedom of navigation are in principle only subject to the 
jurisdiction of the flag state – the Netherlands in the case of the Arctic Sunrise. According to 
the Netherlands none of the exceptions to the exclusiveness of flag state jurisdiction was 
                                                 
30 Ibid., para. 27. 
31 Ibid., paras 27 and 33. 
32 Ibid., para. 20. 
33 Note No. 10344/1, note 14 at p. 2. The note refers to “actions [that] bore the characteristics of terrorist 
activities”.  
34 Adopted on 29 April 1958; 450 UNTS 11. 
35 Leninskii District Court, Order for the seizure of property of 7 October 2013 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.
pdf at pp. 85 and 87), p. 2. The Netherlands has taken the position that the Convention on the High Seas does not 
apply between itself and the Russian Federation in the light of article 311(1) of the LOSC, which indicates that 
the LOSC prevails over the Convention on the High Seas (see Letter, note 13, at Reply to judge ad hoc 
Anderson, p. 5). However, in view of the fact that the provisions on piracy of both conventions are virtually 
identical, it is questionable whether the term prevail in article 311(1) has the effect of making those provisions in 
the Convention on the High Sea inapplicable between its parties. 
36 Order, note 35 at p. 2. 
37 Ibid., p.1. 
38 Judgment of 8 October 2013, note 21 at p. 2; Note 162-N of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in The 
Hague to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 1 October 2013 
((www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations




present at the time the boarding and arrest were carried out, which happened beyond the 
safety zone of the Prirazlomnaya, making them contrary to international law.39 In addition, 
the Netherlands has argued that the actions of Greenpeace in the safety zone of the 
Prirazlomnaya in any case did not warrant the detention of the vessel and its crew.40 
 
The law of the sea dimension of the incident 
The law of the sea provides one of the two frameworks that are relevant in assessing the 
incident involving the Arctic Sunrise and the Prirazlomnaya. The Russian claim that the 
actions of the Arctic Sunrise constituted terrorism has to be reviewed in the context of the 
1988 Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms 
located on the continental shelf (SUA Protocol)41 to which the Netherlands and the Russian 
Federation are parties. The Protocol might seem to cover the actions of the Arctic Sunrise 
against the Prirazlomnaya. Article 2(1) of the Protocol provides that if a person unlawfully 
and intentionally “seizes or exercises control over a fixed platform by force or threat thereof 
or any other form of intimidation” (s)he commits an offense under the Protocol. This also 
extends to persons who attempt to commit such an offense.42 It could well be argued that 
unlawfully and intentionally entering the safety zone of a platform, which in accordance with 
industry standards means that operations on a rig may have to be suspended, amounts to 
taking control of a rig in accordance with article 2 of the SUA Protocol.43 This argument 
would apply a fortiori to Greenpeace’s intended purpose of placing unauthorized personnel 
on the rig to shut it down for a couple of weeks.44 However, it has been observed that 
proposals for a preambular paragraph in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)45 to expressly exclude 
“Greenpeace-style environmental organisations’ seaborne protest operations were not pressed 
on the understanding that such acts were to be considered not to be included in its scope”.46 
However, the nature of a specific action could arguably still lead to it being covered by the 
SUA Convention or its Protocol. 
 
                                                 
39 See The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation) Public sitting of 6 
November 2010; Verbatim Record ITLOS/PV.13/C22/1 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/ITLOS_PV13_C22_1_Eng.pdf), p. 21, lines 23-44 
and p. 22, lines 20-48. 
40 See Letter, note 13, at Reply to question 2; see also below, text at note 6768. 
41 Adopted on 10 March 1988 (1678 UNTS 304). 
42 SUA Protocol, article 2(2). 
43 According to  the Dutch Branch organization of oil and gas producers (NOGEPA) upon an intentional and 
unauthorized entry of a vessel or its boasts into the safety zone of an installation, the operator of the installation 
will, if deemed necessary,  shut it down to ensure the safety of the installation and the personnel stationed on it.  
The further response to such an entry will be assessed on a case by case basis (Communication of R. Hillen, 
Legal Counsel of NOGEPA, to the author of 29 January 2014). 
44 See text at note 24.  
45 Adopted on 10 March 1988; 1678 UNTS 221. 
46 G. Plant “The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation” 
1990 (39) International and Comparative Law Quarterly pp. 27-56 at p. 34. There is no reason to assume that 




The SUA Protocol does not provide an independent basis for exercising enforcement 
jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels. The LOSC is the primary frame of reference for 
making that assessment in case an act falls under the SUA Protocol.47 
 
Defining the actions of the crew of the Arctic Sunrise as piracy resolves the issue of the 
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.48 Article 105 of the LOSC and article 19 of the 
Convention on the High Seas provide that every state may seize a pirate ship and arrest the 
persons on board on the high seas, which for the purposes of these articles includes the 
exclusive economic zone. 49 However, relying on piracy also raises a number of problems. 
Article 101 of the LOSC and article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas indicate that 
piracy only is concerned with acts carried out by the crew of a ship or aircraft against another 
ship or aircraft, and thus would seem to exclude similar actions directed against a fixed 
platform.50 Secondly, the acts have to be committed for private ends. Views differ as to 
whether  politically motivated protests like the actions of the crew of the Arctic Sunrise fall 
under the private ends requirement.51  
 
Articles 56 and 60 of the LOSC offer a basis for the Russian Federation to regulate activities 
on a rig involved in oil activities in its exclusive economic zone. Article 60(2) provides that 
the coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction over such installations. The wording of article 
60(2) indicates that this jurisdiction is comprehensive. Article 60 also entitles the coastal state 
to establish a safety zone around installations. Such safety zones shall not exceed a distance of 
                                                 
47 See further below. 
48 The charge of piracy was subsequently changed into “hooliganism” (see LIVE - Latest Updates from the 
Arctic Sunrise activists (www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/From-peaceful-action-to-dramatic-
seizure-a-timeline-of-events-since-the-Arctic-Sunrise-took-action-September-18-CET/). This offence would not 
have provided a basis for detaining the Arctic Sunrise and arresting its crew beyond the safety zone of the 
installation absent hot pursuit from the safety zone.  
49 On the relation between the two conventions see note 35. 
50 See also L. Lucchini and M. Vœlckel Droit de la mer, Tome 2, Vol. 2 (Pedone, 1996), p. 166; D. Guilfoyle 
Greenpeace ‘Pirates’ and the MV Arctic Sunrise (http://www.ejiltalk.org/greenpeace-pirates-and-the-mv-arctic-
sunrise/).  The LOSC Convention does not provide a definition of the term ship and certain conventions, such as 
e.g. the MARPOL Convention, include fixed platforms in the definition of  the term (International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 2 November 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1 June 1978 and 
the Protocol of 26 September 1997; as regularly amended, article 2(4)). The LOSC itself does seem to make a 
distinction between installations and ships (see e.g. LOSC, article 208 and 211). The SUA Convention and SUA 
Protocol distinguish between fixed platforms and ships (SUA Convention, article 1(1); SUA Protocol, article 1). 
The latter is defined as “any vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed” (SUA 
Convention, article 1(1)). 
51 For the view that the term private ends does not cover the actions of Greenpeace see e.g. J.L. Jesus “Protection 
of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects” 2003 (18) IJMCL, pp. 363-399 at p. 379; 
see also M. Byers et al. Statement of Concern 
(www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/other/Statement-of-concern.pdf) who maintain 
that the action of the Arctic Sunrise was not covered by the definition of article 105 of the LOSC, without 
singling out specific elements of the definition. For the view that such actions would be included in the term 
private ends see e.g. M. Halberstam, “Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO 
Convention on Maritime Security” 1988 (82) American Journal of International Law, pp. 269-310 at p. 290; D. 
Guilfoyle Can Russia prosecute Greenpeace protestors over the Arctic Sunrise? 




500 meters around them.52 Article 60 indicates that a safety zone may extend beyond 500 
meters if it is authorized by generally accepted international standards or recommended by the 
competent international organization, i.e. the International Maritime Organization (IMO). No 
such standards or recommendations have been developed to date.53 The fact that the Russian 
Federation distinguished the 3-nautical-mile zone around the Prirazlomnaya from the 500-
meter safety zone around the rig indicates that the Russian Federation has not relied on article 
60 in establishing the 3-nautical-mile zone. The only other basis for establishing this zone 
could be article 234 of the LOSC, which allows a coastal state to adopt non-discriminatory 
rules and regulations in ice-covered areas within the limits of its exclusive economic zone. 
However, the fact that the Russian Federation justified the 3-nautical-mile zone by reference 
to the danger to shipping might suggest that it is not intended to implement article 234, which 
is concerned with laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution from vessels. Finally, the Russian Federation at no point seems to have relied on 
article 234. It seems thus safe to conclude that the 3-nautical-mile zone does not have any 
relevance in determining the applicable international legal framework. 
 
The LOSC provides that all ships are required to respect the safety zone around an 
installation.54 A ship entering the safety zone is in violation of this provision of the LOSC and 
cannot invoke the freedom of navigation as a justification for this infraction. Article 58(3) of 
the LOSC explicitly provides that states in exercising the freedom of navigation “shall comply 
the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal state in accordance with the provisions of [the 
LOSC]”. In the present case, the coastal state had established a safety zone in accordance with 
article 60 of the LOSC entailing the obligation of foreign-flagged ships to respect that zone. 
The fact that the requirement to respect the safety zone implies an obligation to refrain from 
entering the zone is confirmed by a number of considerations. First, article 60(6) makes 
reference to respecting the zone as such and not to respecting measures inside the zone. 
Secondly, article 60(6) requires ships to comply with generally accepted standards regarding 
navigation in the vicinity of safety zones, thus making a distinction between the safety zone 
itself and the area beyond the zone. Finally, an IMO resolution on this issue explicitly 
recommends government to “take all necessary steps to ensure that, unless specifically 
authorized, ships flying their flags do not enter or pass through duly established safety 
zones”.55 The IMO resolution also addresses the measures vessels navigating in the vicinity of 
offshore installations should take. Vessels should among others “navigate with caution, giving 
due consideration to safe speed and safe passing distances” and “where appropriate, take  
early and substantial avoiding action when approaching such an installation […] to facilitate 
                                                 
52 LOSC, article 60(5). For a discussion of the origin of the figure of 500 meters, which suggests that the 
establishment of a zone with this breadth may not always be justified see S. Oda “Proposals for revising the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf” 7 1 (1968) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law pp. 1-31 at pp. 21-23.  
53 This issue has been considered by IMO’s sub-committee on the safety of navigation. In 2010 the sub-
committee concluded that there at present was no demonstrated need for safety zones of more than 500 meters 
(Report to the Maritime Safety Committee (NAV 56/20 of 31 August 2010), paras 4.15-4.16). 
54 LOSC, article 60(6). 
55 IMO Assembly Resolution A.671(16) Safety zones and safety of navigation around offshore installations and 
structures of 19 October 1989 (doc. A 16/Res.671 of 30 November 1989, para. 1(d). The preambular 




the installation’s […] awareness of the vessel’s closest point of approach”.56 Although these 
measures in themselves are not obligatory, in view of IMO’s role under the LOSC and the fact 
that they are contained in an IMO Assembly resolution, they constitute “generally accepted 
international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of [installations with which all 
ships] shall comply”. 57 
 
Article 60 of the LOSC does not explicitly address enforcement jurisdiction in relation to 
infractions of the rules and regulations of the coastal state in relation to installations and their 
safety zones. In the light of the full jurisdiction of the coastal state over such installations, full 
enforcement jurisdiction also exists over these installations.58 Article 60(4) indicates that the 
enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal state in the safety zone is limited. The coastal state in a 
safety zone may “take appropriate measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the 
[installation]”. Article 60 does not further specify what the term “appropriate” means. In view 
of the coastal state’s jurisdiction over installations and the safety zones around them, the 
coastal state in first instance has the competence to determine what constitute appropriate 
measures and in this respect will have a margin of discretion.59 As article 60 entails a 
prohibition for vessels to enter a safety zone without authorization, it has to be presumed that 
the appropriate measures a coastal state may take in accordance with article 60(4) include 
measures aimed at ending the unauthorized presence of a vessel in the safety zone. The 
circumstance of the specific case will play a role in determining the exact nature of these 
measures. A single instance of unauthorized entry might be answered by requesting the vessel 
to leave the safety zone and upon non-compliance measures could be taken to remove the 
vessel from the safety zone. Intentional unauthorized entry into the safety zone could also 
give rise to measures to prevent further infringements of a safety zone. For instance, the 
Norwegian authorities in 1993 temporarily seized the documents of the Greenpeace vessel 
Solo following a protest against the Ross Rig.60 
 
Article 60(4) does not refer to the possibility for the coastal state to take enforcement action 
beyond the safety zone of an installation. A restrictive interpretation of the enforcement 
jurisdiction of the coastal state in relation to infringements of a safety zone is confirmed by 
article 111 of the LOSC. Article 111 accords the coastal state the right of hot pursuit. This 
right entails that where the competent authorities of the coastal state have good reason to 
                                                 
56 Ibid., Annex; Recommendations on safety zones and safety of navigation around offshore installations and 
structures, paras 2.1 and 2.2. 
57 LOSC, article 60(6). 
58 The ILC in the commentary on its draft articles on installations on the continental shelf observed that 
“installations are under the jurisdiction of the coastal State for the purpose of maintaining order and of the civil 
and criminal competence of the courts” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956 Vol. II, pp. 299-
300). 
59 It this connection it can moreover be observed that the precursor of article 60(4) of the LOSC, article 5(2) of 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf (adopted on 29 April 1958; 499 UNTS 311) provided that the coastal 
state in a safety zone was entitled to take “measures necessary for” the protection of installations. This indicates 
that in drafting article 60 of the LOSC it was intended to provide coastal states with a larger measure of 
discretion than they enjoyed under the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
60 This measure was litigated up to the Norwegian Supreme Court, which upheld the measure of the Norwegian 




believe that a ship has violated its laws and regulations they may pursue a ship and stop it and 
take enforcement actions.61 Article 111 in this connection explicitly refers to hot pursuit from 
safety zones around continental shelf installations.62 This reference includes a rig like the 
Prirazlomnaya since it is both located in the exclusive economic zone and over the 
continental shelf of the Russian Federation and is used in connection with the exploitation of 
the resources of the continental shelf. The explicit reference to the safety zone of installations 
in article 111 confirms that the coastal state only has enforcement jurisdiction in relation to a 
foreign-flagged ship that has violated the coastal state’s legislation in relation to the 
installation or its safety zone if that enforcement action is taken inside the safety zone or after 
a hot pursuit starting from that safety zone. A restrictive interpretation of the coastal state’s 
enforcement jurisdiction in relation to infractions of a safety zone around installations also 
logically follows from the approach to enforcement jurisdiction in coastal state maritime 
zones. Generally, the coastal state may take enforcement actions if a ship is still in the 
maritime zone in which the infraction took place. This might suggest that the coastal state 
could take enforcement action against the infraction of a safety zone anywhere in its 
continental shelf or exclusive economic zone. However, a safety zone is a special zone in 
these latter zones, in which the coastal state has rights that it does not otherwise have in the 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.63 This indicates that enforcement jurisdiction in 
relation to these rights only exist inside the safety zone, just like enforcement jurisdiction in 
relation to maritime zones in general cannot be exercised beyond the outer limit of those 
zones.64 This same argument is applicable to the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in 
relation to infractions of the legislation of the coastal state applicable to the installation itself.  
 
The human rights dimension65 
Greenpeace has justified its actions directed at the Prirazlomnaya by invoking human rights 
law. For instance, in an amicus curiae submission to the ITLOS in the provisional measures 
procedure initiated by the Netherlands, Greenpeace observed that: 
On 18 September 2013, the M/Y “Arctic Sunrise”, a ship operated by [Greenpeace] 
was present in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation in order to 
protest peacefully (in exercise of rights of freedom of expression and assembly) 
against the offshore ice-resistant fixed platform “Prirazlomnaya”. In the early morning 
of 18 September 2013, a number of rigid hull inflatable boats left the M/Y “Arctic 
                                                 
61 LOSC, article 111(1). 
62 Ibid., article 111(2). Article 111 does not explicitly refer to the right of hot pursuit starting from continental 
shelf installations. However, since an installation is located inside the safety zone, it has to be presumed that the 
right of hot pursuit applies mutatis mutandis when the pursuit starts from the installation. 
63 See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950 Vol. I, p. 234, paras 59-60. 
64 The exception of course being the territorial sea in which case the coastal State may also take enforcement 
action in the contiguous zone (LOSC, article 33). However, this point rather confirms the position in relation to 
the safety zone. In that case no provision is made for exercising enforcement jurisdiction beyond the safety zone 
safe for the situation of hot pursuit from that zone. 
65 For another review of human rights law and protests at sea see J. Teulings “Peaceful Protests against Whaling 
on the High Seas – A Human Rights-Based Approach” in C.R. Symmons (ed.) Selected Contemporary Issues in 
the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 221-249. This analysis puts much emphasis on the 
statements in the case law subscribing to the importance of the freedom of expression but is largely silent on the 




Sunrise” and their occupants sought to take part in a peaceful protest, which involved 
two of their number scaling the walls of the base of the platform up to a point some 
distance below the main deck.66 
 
The Netherlands has subscribed to this point of view. In reply to a question from the ITLOS 
in the proceedings on provisional measures the Netherlands submitted that the evaluation of 
the legality of the Russian measures against the Greenpeace activists “must be assessed in the 
light of the fact that the crew was exercising their [sic] freedom of expression, freedom of 
demonstration and freedom of peaceful protest”.67 The Netherlands at the same time indicated 
that in its view the “freedom of expression at sea should only be exercised as long as the 
safety at sea is ensured and international legislation is adhered to”.68 The position of 
Greenpeace and the Netherlands implies that the exercise of the freedom of expression 
prevails over the prohibition contained in article 60(6) of the LOSC for ships to enter the 
safety zone of an installation without authorization.69 The position of the Netherlands also 
implies that the exercise of the freedom of expression curtails the possibilities of the coastal 
state to take enforcement action against a vessel that does not respect a safety zone. Assessing 
the actions of Greenpeace in the light of this appeal to the freedom of expression and 
assembly is also relevant in determining whether or not they are covered by article 2 of the 
SUA Protocol and the LOSC provisions on piracy. 
 
The freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly are guaranteed by major human 
rights instruments such as European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms70 (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).71  
                                                 
66 Amicus Curiae Submission by Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) dated 30 October 
2013 (www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/climate/2013/ITLOS-amicus-curiae-
brief-30102013.pdf), para. 1.4. The Tribunal did not include the submission in the case file (Order of 22 
November 2013, para. 18.). See also the statement of Daniel Simons, Legal Counsel Campaigns and Actions of 
Greenpeace International, during the oral proceedings at the ITLOS concerning the Dutch request for provisional 
measures (Verbatim Record, note 39, p. 17, lines 9-17). 
67 Letter, note 13, at Reply to question 2. 
68 Letter, note 13, at Reply to question 1.   
69 The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs previously seems to have taken a different position. In reply to 
questions from Members of Parliament he indicated that the reported institution of a 4-nautical-mile safety zone 
around the survey vessel Geolog Dmitry Nalivkin by the Russian Federation was excessive in character because 
it in practice deprived Greenpeace of the right to demonstrate peacefully and because the LOSC provided for a 
standard safety zone of 500 meters (Vragen, note 16 at answer to question 4). 
70 Adopted on 4 November 1950 (www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf), articles 10 and 11. 
71 Adopted on 16 December 1966 (999 UNTS 172), articles 19 and 21. The Netherlands and the Russian 
Federation are both parties to both conventions. In view of the extensive jurisprudence of the ECtHR on freedom 
of expression and assembly and the fact that both the Netherlands and the Russian Federation are parties to the 
ECHR, the present analysis focuses on the case law of the ECtHR. A detailed analysis of the practice under the 
ICCPR and other regional human rights treaties is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Legal literature 
indicates that these different human rights bodies take into account each other’s jurisprudence in interpreting the 
scope of rights and freedoms (see e.g. E.A. Bertoni “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights: A dialogue on freedom of expression standards” 2009 European Human 
Rights Law Review pp. 332-352 at pp. 348-352; L. Burgorgue-Larsen and A.Úbeda de Torres The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights; Case Law and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 541-542; A. 
Raisz Transfer of Values as to the Regional Human Rights Tribunals (http://www.esil-




These freedoms are not only guaranteed in the territory of the parties to these Conventions but 
also “whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, 
and thus jurisdiction”.72 There can be no doubt that this implies that a coastal State is required 
to guarantee these freedoms on installations, over which it has exclusive jurisdiction.73 Article 
60(4) of the LOSC on safety zones around installations does not explicitly refer to the 
exercise of jurisdiction and control. However, the establishment of a safety zone around an 
installation and the taking of specific measures in it in accordance with article 60(4) implies 
that the coastal State is exercising control and authority over the safety zone and as a 
consequence is also required to guarantee human rights in the safety zone. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its jurisprudence has repeatedly 
emphasized the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
assembly. For instance, in Kudrevičius the ECtHR observed:  
the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and, 
like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society. 
Thus, it should not be interpreted restrictively.74 
 
Notwithstanding this fundamental importance and the requirement to not interpret these 
freedoms restrictively, they are subject restrictions.75 In the present incident involving the 
Arctic Sunrise and the Prirazlomnaya, two issues are particularly relevant. First, do the 
freedoms of expression and assembly as among other guaranteed by the ECHR trump the 
prohibition to enter safety zones contained in article 60 of the LOSC? Secondly, if there is a 
right of entry into a safety zone to express one’s opinion what kind of restrictions may be 
imposed on those exercising these freedoms in a safety zone or on an installation? 
Restrictions in this case could both be imposed to ensure the safety of navigation and the 
installation as provided for in article 60 of the LOSC as articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR refer 
to public safety, and the protection of the rights of others. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
p. 1). The ECtHR, being the longest functioning court, has been particularly influential in this respect (see e.g. 
Bertoni, note 7172 at p 348-352; Burgorgue-Larsen and Úbeda de Torres, note 7172 at pp. 541-542). This 
interaction does not exclude that different human rights bodies would reach distinct conclusions on specific 
points, in particular because certain norms are not formulated in identical manner in the relevant human rights 
treaties. For instance, Bertoni submits that article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights: 
has been designed to be more “generous” than [article 10 of the ECHR]. Thus the interpretation of 
[article 10 by the ECtHR] may provide a minimum standard for the interpretation of [article 13], but 
never a ceiling. The judgments of the Inter-American Court reviewed in this paper also support this 
contention (Bertoni, note 7172 at p. 352; see also Burgorgue-Larsen and Úbeda de Torres, note 7172 at 
pp.543-544 and 548). 
72 See e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber) case of Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 
2011 (hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-105606?TID=sfnmsxdoiz), para. 137. 
73 LOSC, article 60(4). 
74 ECtHR (Second Section), case of Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, judgment of 26 November 2013 
(hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-138556?TID=ldqtpozmxd), para. 80. 




The prohibition of entry into a specific maritime zone has been considered by the ECtHR in 
Women on Waves. 76 In this case Portugal had refused the vessel Borndiep,  which was being 
used by the organization Women on Waves for imparting information on among others birth 
control, access to the Portuguese territorial sea. 77 Women on Waves had intended to use the 
Borndiep for various activities in the Portuguese port of Figueira da Foz. In assessing the 
general prohibition of entry into the territorial sea, the ECtHR distinguished the case at hand 
from Appleby78 that had been invoked by the Portuguese government. In Appleby the ECtHR 
had concluded that the freedom of expression did not entail “automatic rights of entry to 
private property or even necessarily all publicly owned property”.79 In Women on Waves, the 
ECtHR concluded that the territorial sea of Portugal by its very nature was a public and open 
space.80 The ECtHR noted that Portugal had a certain margin of appreciation in assessing 
whether the entry of the vessel into the territorial sea could have led to infractions of its 
abortion legislation. However, the Court noted that the facts of the case did not provide 
sufficiently serious grounds to assume that the appellants had the intention to purposely 
violate that legislation.81 Finally, the Court observed that the concern of public safety did not 
entitle a state to take any measure it considered appropriate. According to the Court, Portugal 
certainly disposed of other means than a complete prohibition of the Borndiep to enter the 
territorial sea.82 Such a “radical measure” certainly not only had a dissuasive effect on the 
appellants, but also on others who wanted to impart controversial ideas.83 
Two recent national cases involving Greenpeace International and Greenpeace USA 
specifically discuss the exclusion of activists from a zone around vessels or installations. In a 
case between Shell and Greenpeace USA, the US Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) affirmed a 
preliminary injunction of a district court prohibiting Greenpeace USA from coming within a 
specified distance of vessels employed by Shell in exploratory activities in the Arctic.84 In 
reaching its decision the Court of Appeals concluded that “the district court did not err in 
finding that the balance of equities favors Shell”.85 Shell had an interest in carrying out its 
legally authorized activities without dangerous interference by Greenpeace USA.86 
Greenpeace USA had argued that the imposition of a safety zone prevented it from exercising 
its countervailing First Amendment right to protest Shell’s activities in close proximity of 
                                                 
76 ECtHR (Second Section), affaire Women on Waves et autres c. Portugal, judgment of 3 February 2009 
(hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-91046?TID=uehirtqzoz). 
77 See ibid., para. 8.  
78 ECtHR (Fourth Section), case of Appleby and Others v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 6 May 2003 
(hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-61080?TID=empryzpcxf).  
79 Women on Waves, note 7677, para. 47. 
80 Ibid., para. 40. 
81 Ibid., paras 40-41. 
82 Ibid., para. 43. The ECtHR did not specify what these other means could have consisted of. 
83 Ibid. 
84 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Shell Offshore and Shell Gulf of Mexico v. Greenpeace, 
Opinion, Filed 12 March 2013 (www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35332/pdf/USCOURTS-ca9-12-
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Shell vessels and submitted that this constituted an undue speech restriction.87 The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, observing that the prohibition of a safety zone around 
abortion clinics did not provide a relevant precedent.  While such safety zones would restrict 
the freedom of speech on public sidewalks – “quintessential public fora” – the high seas were 
not a public forum and the safety zones around Shell vessels did not prevent Greenpeace USA 
from communicating with its target audience, because it had no audience at sea.88  The Court 
of Appeals also pointed out that upholding the decision of the district court was justified 
because the injunction was narrowly tailored and the conduct it sought to enjoin posed serious 
risk to human life and property.89  The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument of 
Greenpeace USA that the district court had not taken into account the public interest in having 
it monitor Shell’s activities in the Arctic.  The Court of Appeals observed that this role of 
Greenpeace USA had been taken into account and that for that reason the injunction had been 
crafted narrowly. The district court had moreover envisaged the possibility of modifying the 
injunction to permit Greenpeace to monitor Shell’s activities more closely.90 
The summary proceedings case Capricorn and others v. Greenpeace International and others 
before the District Court of Amsterdam concerned actions of Greenpeace against the oil rigs 
Leiv Eriksson and Ocean Rig Corcovado that Capricorn operated in the exclusive economic 
zone of Greenland.91 The District Court in its decision ruled that Greenpeace for a period of 6 
months had to refrain from entering the 500-meter safety zone of the two rigs as long as they 
operated in the exclusive economic zone of Greenland.92 The 500-meter safety zone around 
the rigs was in accordance with the applicable Greenlandic legislation.93 In reaching its 
decision, the District Court balanced the interests of Greenpeace in drawing the attention of 
the public to the risk of the drilling activities against the interest of Capricorn in pursuing its 
legal activities without interference from Greenpeace.94 The Court in this connection referred 
to the fact that Greenpeace through the actions it had carried out thus far had already 
generated much attention to the risks that were involved, that Capricorn had an interest in a 
safe working environment to conduct its high risk activities, that there likely were high costs 
involved as a result of a delay of its activities, and that only a limited period of time was 
available due to climatological circumstances.95 The District Court did not specify why its 
measure applied to the whole safety zone of the installations.96 
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92 Ibid., para. 5.1. For each day or a part of it Greenpeace would enter the safety zone it would have to pay 
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The Greenlandic authorities arrested Greenpeace activists that scaled the Leiv Eriksson while 
it was involved in exploratory drilling in the exclusive economic zone of Greenland in 2011. 
The activists were prosecuted for breaching Greenlandic legislation prohibiting the entry into 
the safety zone of the rig and trespassing in relation to the rig itself. They were found guilty 
on both counts and sentenced to a fine and deportation from Greenland. The Greenlandic 
court in reaching its decision did take into account the arguments on freedom of expression 
that had been made by the defendants.97  
In assessing the actions of Greenpeace against oil rigs, a distinction has to be made between 
the safety zone around an installation and the installation itself. The former is part of a public 
area, albeit with a regime that is different from the surrounding waters, but the latter is private 
property. As the ECtHR observed in Appleby, the freedom of expression does not entail 
“automatic rights of entry to private property or even necessarily all publicly owned 
property”.98 The only exception in this respect would be a situation in which “the bar on 
access to property has the effect of preventing any effective exercise of freedom of expression 
or it can be said that the essence of the right has been destroyed”.99 In that instance the state 
might have a positive obligation “to protect the enjoyment of the Convention rights by 
regulating property rights”. 100 In Appleby, the applicants had argued that the easiest and most 
effective way of reaching people would be to get access to a privately owned shopping mall. 
The Court held that by being denied access to the shopping mall the applicants had not 
effectively been prevented from communicating their views, as they had had a number of 
alternatives at their disposal.101 
As articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR indicate, the freedoms of expression, assembly and 
association may be subject to restrictions to protect the rights of others. In the case at hand, 
this in the first place concerns the right of the operator of the continental shelf installation. 
The case law on this point indicates that a measure of inconvenience to others should be 
tolerated. An instructive example is provided by Schmidberger, a case before the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ).102 In this case it was alleged that a blockade of the Brenner motorway 
between Austria and Italy by demonstrators that had been allowed by the Austrian authorities 
constituted a restriction on the free movement of goods. The ECJ found that allowing the 
demonstration was not incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty on the European 
Community concerning the free movement of goods.103 The ECJ identified a number of 
reasons for this finding. First, while the free movement of goods constituted a fundamental 
aspect of the Treaty on the European Community, it could be subject to restrictions.104 On the 
other hand, the rights protected by articles 10 and 11of the ECHR could also be subject to 
                                                 
97 Information provided to the author by Mr. M. Nielsen of the Greenlandic police on 1 April 2014. 
98 Appleby, note 7879 at para. 47. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., para. 48. 
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certain restrictions.105 In language that is very similar to that of the ECtHR in Appleby, the 
ECJ observed that it was required: 
that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not, 
taking account of the aim of the restrictions, constitute disproportionate and 
unacceptable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed […]. 
 
In those circumstances, the interests involved must be weighed having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck 
between those interests.106 
 
In assessing the specific circumstances of the blockade of the Brenner motorway, the ECJ 
distinguished this case from actions it had considered in Commission v. France.107 In the latter 
case, French farmers had repeatedly carried out actions against farm products from other 
Member States of the European Communities. In contrast to the latter case, the blockade of 
the Brenner had been authorized by the authorities.108 The ECJ also observed that the 
blockade of the Brenner motorway had been limited in size: “traffic by road was obstructed 
on a single route, on a single occasion and during a period of almost 30 hours”.109 In addition, 
the organizers of the blockade and the authorities had taken various steps to ensure that the 
demonstration passed off smoothly.110 The single blockade also did not result in: 
a general climate of insecurity such as to have a dissuasive effect on intra-Community 
trade flows as a whole, in contrast to the serious and repeated disruptions to public 
order at issue in the case giving rise to the judgment in Commission v France.111  
 
The ECJ considered that the imposition of stricter limitations on the blockade, as had been 
suggested by Schmidberger, was not an option as these “could have been perceived as an 
excessive restriction, depriving the action of a substantial part of its scope”.112  Inconvenience 
had to be tolerated “provided that the objective pursued is essentially the public and lawful 
demonstration of an opinion”.113 
 
In Kudrevičius, the ECtHR had to consider measures the Lithuanian authorities had taken 
against certain participants in an unauthorized road block after a demonstration that had been 
allowed.114 The ECtHR confirmed that the authorities could place restrictions on the freedom 
of assembly in public places to protect the rights of others.115 The ECtHR then applied the 
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proportionality principle for determining whether a balance had been struck between the 
requirements of freedom of assembly and those allowing a limitation of that freedom.116 In 
assessing the circumstances of the case before it, the Court acknowledged that the 
demonstration that had been allowed “dispersed and resulted in major disruptions of traffic on 
three main roads”.117 The Court added that nevertheless any demonstration in a public place 
would inevitably lead a “certain of disruption to ordinary life.”118 To avoid that the freedom 
of assembly would be deprived of all its substance the authorities would have to show a 
degree of tolerance towards peaceful meetings.119 The Court criticized the Lithuanian 
authorities for assessing the conduct of the applicants in terms of rioting. That context did not 
allow for the proper consideration of the restrictions that had been imposed on the freedom of 
assembly.120 In making this finding, the Court took into account that the demonstrators had 
not blocked traffic completely and had been involved in good faith negotiations with the 
government. 121 The dissent of three of the seven judges on this point indicates that the 
application of the proportionality principle may lead to sharply diverging results. The 
minority indicated that the demonstrators had been able to exercise their freedom of assembly 
within the restrictions set by the authorities to safeguard the rights of others.122 The 
unauthorized road blocks without prior warning caught the authorities and the general public 
by surprise and made it impossible to adopt mitigating measures.123 What had been caused 
was not “mere inconvenience to the public”, but “general chaos”.124 
 
In Steel the ECtHR considered protests that physically impeded activities of which the 
applicants disapproved. The Court considered that such protests constituted the expression of 
an opinion within the meaning of article 10 of the ECHR.125 In that light, the Court had to 
assess whether the actions undertaken by the authorities against the applicants “pursued the 
legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others”.126 The Court 
subsequently considered whether the “binding over” of two of the applicants – i.e. requiring 
them to abstain from certain actions – pursued a legitimate aim under article 10(2) of the 
ECHR. The Court considered that the measures taken against one of the applicants, Ms. Steel 
“amounted to serious interferences with the exercise of her right to freedom of expression”.127 
However, the Court concluded that the measures that had been taken against her – effectively 
requiring her to agree to certain conduct for a year – were not excessive in the 
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122 Ibid., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Raimondi, Jočienė and Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 15. 
123 Ibid., para. 16. 
124 Ibid., para. 17. 
125 ECtHR (Chamber), case of Steel and others v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 23 September 1998 
(hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-58240?TID=tdcchtaubk), para. 90. 
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circumstances.128 In this connection the Court referred to the dangers inherent in the form of 
protest that had been chosen and the interest of the public interest in deterring such 
conduct.129 
 
The ECtHR has critically reviewed sanctions that have been imposed on persons in instances 
in which they had exercised the freedom of expression. A fundamental concern of the Court is 
the “chilling effect” that the fear of the imposition of sanctions may have on others.130 As the 
Court observed in Kudeshkina: 
This effect, which works to the detriment of society as a whole, is likewise a factor 
which concerns the proportionality of, and thus the justification for, the sanctions 
imposed on the applicant, who, as the Court has held above, was undeniably entitled to 
bring to the public’s attention the matter at issue.131  
 
The case law of the Court suggests that criminal sanctions should only be imposed in 
exceptional circumstances, For instance in Nikula, the Court concluded that: 
it should be primarily for counsel themselves, subject to supervision by the bench, to 
assess the relevance and usefulness of a defence argument without being influenced by 
the potential “chilling effect” of even a relatively light criminal penalty or an 
obligation to pay compensation for harm suffered or costs incurred.132 
 
In Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre the Court indicated a standard for evaluating when the imposition of 
a prison sentence might be compatible with article 10 of the ECHR: 
Although sentencing is in principle a matter for the national courts, the Court 
considers that the imposition of a prison sentence for a press offence will be 
compatible with journalists’ freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention only in exceptional circumstances, notably where other fundamental rights 
have been seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement 
to violence.133 
 
An assessment of the incident in the light of the applicable law 
The arrest and detention of the Arctic Sunrise by the Russian authorities raises two related 
issues. First, it has to be assessed whether the actions of the Arctic Sunrise constituted a 
breach of rules of international law that justified the response by the Russian Federation. 
Secondly, in view of the above conclusions on the extent of enforcement jurisdiction of the 
coastal state and the fact that the boarding and arrest of the Arctic Sunrise took place outside 
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the safety zone around the Prirazlomnaya, assessing the legality of these actions essentially 
entails an assessment of the question of whether they were carried out after a hot pursuit from 
the safety zone.134  
 
The Russian Federation as the coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction over an installation like 
the Prirazlomnaya that is being used to exploit the mineral resources of its continental shelf. 
On the installation, the Russian Federation is entitled to enforce all applicable legislation. In 
the safety zone of the installation the Russian Federation would be entitled to take appropriate 
measures to ensure the safety of navigation and that of the installation. The Netherlands has 
submitted that the detention of two crew members of the Arctic Sunrise in the safety zone of 
the Prirazlomnaya did not constitute “appropriate measures” to ensure the safety of 
navigation and the installation as the crew never posed a threat to the safety of navigation or 
the installation.135 This position of the Netherlands is based on a narrow construction of the 
term safety that is not justified by the implications an unauthorized entry into a safety zone or 
on an installation has for its operation.136 As was set out above, such an unauthorized may 
lead to an interruption of the activities of the rig and seriously impede its operation. . As one 
of the activists involved in the action against the Prirazlomnaya indicated, the purpose of 
entering the safety zone and scaling the rig was to delay its operations for a couple of 
weeks.137 Viewed in this context, article 60(4) of the LOSC would allow the Russian 
Federation to take appropriate measures to end the unauthorized presence of a vessel in the 
safety zone and in case of repeated infractions of the safety zone it could take additional 
measures to prevent further their further occurrence. 
 
Viewed in isolation, the LOSC regime would have allowed the Russian Federation to take 
enforcement actions against the activists that scaled the Prirazlomnaya and the Arctic 
Sunrise.138 However, human rights law is also relevant to assess the incident. The review of 
human rights law indicates that in this connection a distinction has to be made between public 
areas and private property, that is, a distinction has to be made between the safety zone and 
the installation. As Appleby indicates the state only has to take action for regulating access to 
private property if the absence of access would have the effect of preventing any exercise of 
the freedom of expression or would destroy the essence of that freedom.139 In the present case, 
the absence of access to the installation does not have these consequences. Greenpeace would 
have ample opportunity to express itself in the vicinity of the installation and such action 
would allow it to communicate with its target audience in a similar manner as through an 
action on the installation itself. 
                                                 
134 In view of the nature of the incident it is not material to determine whether the hot pursuit may have actually 
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135 Letter, note 13, at Reply to question 2. 
136 The US and Dutch court cases discussed above also indicate a broader view of safety of an installation. 
137 See the text at footnote 24. 
138 Although the Arctic Sunrise did not enter the safety zone itself, its boats did, leading to the constructive 
presence of the vessel in that zone (see LOSC, article 111(4)). 
139 Obviously, such an obligation neither exists for the operator. In those circumstances it would be possible to 





A safety zone around and installation is not private property but it is part of a public area, in 
which the freedom of expression and assembly in principle applies. However, there may be 
limitations on these freedoms, as long as they meet the criteria listed in articles 10(2) and 
11(2) of the ECHR. Public safety and the rights of others figure among these criteria. Safety 
concerns are the main reason for allowing the establishment of safety zones around offshore 
installations. The safety zone moreover has important implications for the rights of the 
operator and the owner of an installation. The infringement of a safety zone will cause a 
shutdown of an installation leading to delays and economic loss. This raises the question 
whether these other interests justify a complete ban on the exercise of the freedom of 
expression and assembly inside the safety zone of an installation. The case law that was 
discussed in the preceding section indicates that it is necessary to balance the rights and 
interests involved to reach a conclusion. In carrying out this balancing exercise a number of 
considerations could be taken into account. Safety zones are a carefully crafted exception to 
the regime of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone with a very limited scope 
of application.140 In this light an analogy with the finding of the ECtHR in Women on Waves 
that a prohibition to enter the territorial sea of Portugal was an undue limitation on the 
freedom of expression because the territorial sea is by its very nature a public and open space 
is unconvincing. The argument that Portugal in this case had other means at its disposal for 
the protection of the public order and public health than a prohibition to enter the territorial 
waters of Portugal is also in unpersuasive in the present case. A safety zone rather can be seen 
as such other means that are applied instead of a broader restriction. The latter approach in 
this case would also be problematic from a law of the sea perspective. 
 
Secondly, the unauthorized entry in a safety zone directly affects the rights of the operator of 
an installation as it results in the interruption of operations. As the costs involved in operating 
continental shelf installations are high, even a limited interruption of activities could lead to 
substantial loss entailing much more than inconvenience, the standard applied in the case law 
in balancing the exercise of the freedoms of expression and assembly with the rights of others. 
On the other hand, a blanket prohibition to enter the safety zone of installations would prevent 
activists from carrying out their actions in the manner that they consider to be most effective. 
Drawing attention to the risks involved in exploring for and exploiting Artic oil and gas in the 
vicinity of an installation is markedly different from protesting beyond the perimeter of a 
safety zone. The ECtHR has repeatedly confirmed that article 10 of the ECtHR not only 
protects “the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which 
they are conveyed”.141 The nature of the activities taking place on a rig would also be a factor 
to be taken into account. Drawing the attention to the risks involved in deep-water drilling or 
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in an Arctic environment would in principle deserve more protection than protests against a 
low-risk activity that is not a matter of great public concern.  
 
The above considerations suggest that limited actions inside a safety zone of the 
Prirazlomnaya should have been tolerated to achieve a proper balance between the interests 
involved. The stated purpose of the action of Greenpeace in September 2013 – a shutdown of 
the Prirazlomnaya for a couple of weeks – in any case would seem to tilt the balance too 
much in the direction of the exercise of the freedom of expression. Such an action would not 
result in inconvenience but substantial detriment.142 The two national cases on safety zones 
discussed above might suggest that in certain instances a complete prohibition to enter a 
safety zone would achieve a proper balance of the rights concerned. However, the US District 
Court in this connection takes a very restrictive view of what constitutes a public forum to 
reach target audiences. In combination with present day means communication, such as web-
based services, imaginative actions on the oceans may be very effective in reaching one’s 
target audience. The decision of the District Court at the same time indicates that the freedom 
of expression and pointing out the risks of certain activities may require preventing that safety 
measures, or the rights of others, make a close watch on controversial and risky activities 
impossible. The District Court of Amsterdam reached its conclusion that a balancing of the 
interests involved required a ruling in favor of Capricorn while among others noting that 
Greenpeace had by its actions already been able to draw ample attention to the dangers related 
to the activities of Capricorn and that Capricorn due to the climatological conditions only had 
a limited period in which to carry out its activities. This reasoning leaves the door open to 
reach a different conclusion in other circumstances. Both cases do point to the substantial 
weight that is attributed safety considerations. A similar approach is apparent from Steel.143 
 
A final point to be noted about the interaction between the law of the sea and human rights 
law is that it is on the coastal state to carry out the balancing of the various interest involved 
in assessing to what extent exercising the freedom of expression is allowed inside a safety 
zone, not the flag state of the vessel. This includes the taking of appropriate enforcement 
measures. As article 60(4) of the LOSC indicates it is on the coastal state to make the 
assessment what constitute appropriate measures to ensure the safety of navigation and the 
installation.144 
 
In this particular case, the Russian Federation took the decision to prohibit the Arctic Sunrise 
from entering the safety zone of the Prirazlomnaya. In view of the purpose of the action 
Greenpeace – a shutdown of the rig for a couple of weeks –,145 such a refusal might be judged 
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to be reasonable. In this connection it could also be taken into consideration that Greenpeace 
had already carried out a number of actions against oil activities in the Russian Federation’s 
maritime zones in 2012 and 2013.  
 
The available information suggests that the enforcement actions taken by the Russian 
Federation at sea in general were proportionate and graduated. After a repeated warning not to 
enter the safety zone, Greenpeace activists were prevented from scaling the platform.146 
Subsequently, the Arctic Sunrise was ordered to stop for boarding and warning shots were 
fired when this order was not obeyed. Only after the warning shots were fired the threat was 
made to fire on the vessel, but this threat in any case was not effectuated. The boarding of the 
vessel from a helicopter by armed officials could be justified by the reference to the repeated 
refusal of the vessel to allow boarding from the Coast Guard vessel Ladoga.  
 
It is on the other hand clear that the charges that were brought against the crew of the Arctic 
Sunrise, involving long prison terms, were contrary to the case law of the ECtHR in respect of 
acceptable sanctions in the context of freedom of expression. The sanctions that were 
envisaged in the charges no doubt would have had the “chilling effect” the Court finds 
unacceptable. For this same reason, framing the peaceful actions of the Arctic Sunrise and its 
crew in the term of piracy under the LOSC or offences under the SUA Protocol would not be 
compatible with article 10 and 11 of the ECHR.147 On the other hand, as Steel indicates, the 
ECtHR has accepted that the authorities can take quite far reaching measures to restrict the 
freedom of expression where it affects safety or the rights of others – i.e. requiring people to 
abstain from certain behavior for a period of time and upon non-compliance impose further 
sanctions. The Norwegian Supreme Court case involving the Greenpeace vessel Solo and the 
measures of the Greenlandic authorities against Greenpeace activists indicate possible 
approaches the Russian authorities could have taken in respect of the Arctic Sunrise and its 
crew.148 
 
Turning to the issue of hot pursuit, a number of conditions of article 111 of the LOSC 
undoubtedly were met by the Russian Federation.149 For instance, the fact that the Arctic 
Sunrise itself did not enter the safety zone is immaterial, in view of the fact that its boats did 
                                                 
146 As video footage indicates (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kx2tSVAsQc8), shots were fired from the 
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reportedly intended that they would not apply in the case of peaceful protest at sea (see above text at note 46).  
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149 For a discussion of the regime of hot pursuit see e.g. N.M. Poulantzas The Right of Hot Pursuit in 
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enter the safety zone.150 Article 111 provides that in such a case the right of hot pursuit also 
applies to the vessel concerned.151 However, two points in the available accounts of the 
incident raise questions about whether the Russian Federation  complied with the 
requirements of article 111 of the LOSC, making the subsequent arrest of the Artic Sunrise 
illegal. First, the accounts of the incident that are available do not make it possible to establish 
with certainty whether the requirement that a pursuit was commenced after a visual or 
auditory signal was given while the boats of the Arctic Sunrise were still in the safety zone of 
the Prirazlomnaya.152 As was observed above, a considerable time elapsed between the events 
near and on the rig and the order by the Coast Guard vessel Ladoga to the master of the Arctic 
Sunrise to stop for inspection. Secondly, article 111(1) requires that the pursuit is not 
interrupted. The somewhat opaque description contained in the judgment of the Russian Coast 
Guard authorities of 8 October 2013 does not suggest that there was an interruption of the 
pursuit. However, the more detailed account provided by Greenpeace International rather 
would seem to indicate that the hot pursuit actually was interrupted. That account refers to 
contacts between the Ladoga and the Arctic Sunrise concerning the voluntary inspection of 
the Arctic Sunrise and a request to the vessel to move away from the Prirazlomnaya. These 
events seem difficult to square with a continued hot pursuit.153  
 
The arbitration process 
The Netherlands instituted proceedings in relation to the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise under 
Part XV of the LOSC on 4 October 2013.154 In view of the fact that the Netherlands and the 
Russian Federation have not chosen the same third party dispute settlement body, the case 
will be considered and decided by an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex 
VII to the LOSC.155 As was noted above, the Russian Federation did not accept the arbitration 
initiated by the Netherlands in this specific case. To justify this course of action the Russian 
Federation referred to the fact that upon ratification of the LOSC in 1997 it had made a 
declaration indicating that it did not accept compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms in 
relation to among others “disputes concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the 
exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction”.156  
 
At face value, this declaration would seem to allow the Russian Federation to reject 
arbitration in this particular case. However, if read in conjunction with the relevant provisions 
of the LOSC, the Russian position collapses. The declaration constitutes a reservation or 
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exception to the LOSC. Article 309 of the LOSC provides that reservations or exceptions may 
only be made if they are expressly permitted by the Convention. Article 298 of the LOSC 
allows a state to exclude only certain disputes concerning law enforcement activities, namely 
those activities that are mentioned paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 297 of the LOSC. These 
paragraphs are concerned with respectively marine scientific research and fisheries and thus 
have no relevance for this specific case. On the other hand, paragraph 1 of article 297 is 
relevant to this specific case and no reservation or exception to this paragraph is allowed by 
the Convention. Although article 297(1) in principle excludes disputes concerning the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a coastal state of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction provided for 
in the LOSC, the paragraph then continues by providing that these disputes are nonetheless 
subject to compulsory procedures in a number of specific cases. One of those concerns the 
situation in which it is alleged that the coastal state has acted in contravention of the 
provisions of the Convention in regard to the freedom of navigation.157 The Arctic Sunrise 
incident falls under this exception to the exception to compulsory dispute settlement 
contained in article 297. Article 297(1) has a broad scope and it also covers the question 
whether the measures the coastal state has taken in a safety zone are in accordance with article 
60(4) of the LOSC.158 It also covers the question whether the Russian Federation in effecting 
the boarding and arrest of the Arctic Sunrise acted in accordance with the requirements for hot 
pursuit contained in article 111 of the LOSC. 
 
The Russian Federation could have raised the significance of its declaration and the exception 
to compulsory dispute settlement contained in article 297(1) either by starting preliminary 
proceedings under article 294 of the LOSC or by making preliminary objections in the context 
of the arbitration.159 Recourse to article 294 in all likelihood would not have been successful. 
Article 294 allows a state to ask for a determination that a claim in a dispute that is covered by 
article 297 of the LOSC is an abuse of legal process or is prima facie well-founded. In the 
former case a court or tribunal shall take no further action in the case. In the light of the 
circumstances of the case, it would seem to be unlikely that a tribunal would conclude that the 
application of the Netherlands constituted an abuse of process. This is confirmed by the fact 
that the ITLOS in its Order on provisional measures concluded that the arbitral tribunal prima 
facie had jurisdiction.160 The Russian Federation could also have raised preliminary 
objections during the arbitration procedure, arguing that it had not acted in contravention of 
the LOSC and that consequently, article 297(1) of the LOSC did not offer a basis for 
jurisdiction. However, such preliminary objections would go to the heart of the dispute on the 
merits. As a consequence, raising the preliminary objections would in any case not have 
avoided a discussion of and judgment on the law enforcement activities of the Russian 
authorities.161 The Russian Federation would also have had the option to raise a preliminary 
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objection in relation to article 283 of the LOSC.162 This matter would not have required also 
looking at the merits for it to be decided, but would not have prevented the indication of 
provisional measures. 
 
The refusal of the Russian Federation to participate in the arbitral proceedings does not put a 
stop to them. A first step in this procedure is the constitution of the tribunal. The Netherlands 
in its application instituting the proceedings nominated its arbitrator. Annex VII also provides 
for a procedure to nominate the remaining four arbitrators if the respondent state refuses to 
participate in the procedure.163 In accordance with this procedure, on 15 November 2013 the 
Netherlands requested the appointment of the Russian Federation’s arbitrator and on 13 
December the nomination of the three remaining arbitrators. The appointment procedure was 
finalized on 10 January 2014.164 Now that the tribunal has been constituted it can start 
considering the case. Annex VII to the LOSC requires that in a case of non-appearance a 
tribunal “must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the 
claim is well founded in fact and law”.165 As the ITLOS hinted at in its Order on provisional 
measures of 22 November 2013, the non-appearance of a party may make it more difficult for 
a tribunal to establish the law and the facts.166 The ITLOS at the same time noted “the 
Netherlands should not be put at a disadvantage because of the non-appearance of the Russian 
Federation in the proceedings”.167  
 
Unless the Netherlands and the Russian Federation reach a settlement out of court, the 
arbitration will continue until the tribunal renders its decision. In view of the non-appearance 
of the Russian Federation, the procedure may be limited to one round of written pleadings and 
one round of oral pleadings by the Netherlands and a decision may still be rendered in late 
2014 or early 2015. 
 
The decision on the Netherlands requests from the tribunal implies that the focus of the 
arbitration will be on whether or not the boarding and detention of the Arctic Sunrise by the 
Russian authorities were carried out in accordance with the LOSC.168 The legality of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
merits. This joining would have implied a full discussion of the merits even in case the preliminary objections 
would eventually have been upheld. 
162 For a discussion of this point see text at note 193194 and following. 
163 LOSC, Annex VII, article 3 
164 See Arbitrators Appointed in the Arbitral Proceedings instituted by the Kingdom of the Netherlands against 
the Russian Federation in respect of the Dispute regarding the Arctic Sunrise (ITLOS/Press 207 of 13 January 
2014 (www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_207_E.pdf). 
165 LOSC, Annex VII, article 9. 
166 Order, note 11 at para. 54. 
167 Ibid., para. 56. 
168 The mixed nature of the dispute concerning the Arctic Sunrise incident raises the question whether an arbitral 
constituted under Annex VII of the LOSC would have jurisdiction to deal with all its aspects. Article 288 of the 
LOSC provides that an Annex VII Tribunal has jurisdiction over “any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
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MOX Plant case considered that there was a “cardinal distinction” between its jurisdiction and the law to be 
applied by it (Dispute Concerning the MOX Plant, International Movements of Radioactive Materials, and the 




actions of the Arctic Sunrise will only have to be assessed to the extent this is required to 
determine whether or not the Russian authorities acted in accordance with article 111 in 
commencing the hot pursuit of the Arctic Sunrise.169 
 
The order of the ITLOS on provisional measures 
In filing its application instituting proceedings on 4 October 2013, the Netherlands also asked 
the Russian Federation to take provisional measures to ensure the release of the Arctic Sunrise 
and its crew and indicated that it would turn to the ITLOS if the Russian Federation would not 
do so within 14 days.170 This approach is explained by article 290(1) of the LOSC, which 
provides that if a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal and that court or 
tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction it: 
may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the 
circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to 
prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.  
 
Since the Russian Federation did not comply with the Dutch request to release the Arctic 
Sunrise, on 21 October 2013 the Netherlands turned to the ITLOS in accordance with article 
290(5) of the LOSC.171 The ITLOS may prescribe provisional measures in accordance with 
article 290 “if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have 
jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires.”172 . The Netherlands requested 
the Tribunal to prescribe that the Russian Federation: immediately release of the Arctic 
Sunrise and its crew; immediately suspend all national proceedings and refrain from 
commencing new proceedings; refrain from taking or enforcing judicial or administrative 
measures against the Arctic Sunrise, its crew, its owners and operators; and ensure that no 
other action which might aggravate or extend the dispute would be taken.173 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2003, para. 19). The tribunal also observed that “to the extent that any aspects of Ireland’s claims arise directly 
under legal instruments other than the Convention, such claims may be inadmissible” (ibid.). In the arbitration 
instituted by the Netherlands, the main issue in dispute arises directly under the LOSC, i.e. whether the arrest of 
the Arctic Sunrise was in accordance with the relevant provisions of the LOSC. The tribunal also may need to 
look at certain human rights issues in determining this issue, but that would not constitute claims of the 
Netherlands “directly under legal instruments other than the Convention”. It would seem that the tribunal in any 
case would not need to consider the merits of the human rights issues involved, but only would need to establish 
whether or not the Russian Federation would be prevented from exercising enforcement jurisdiction as a 
consequence of the existence of such rights. The relevant provisions of the ECHR indicate that it would first of 
all be on the Russian Federation to determine what kind of enforcement actions it could take in this respect. One 
specific claim of the Netherlands in instituting the proceedings under the LOSC would seem to be inadmissible if 
the finding of the MOX Plant tribunal on article 293 of the LOSC were to be applied. This concerns the claim 
that the Russian Federation breached its obligations under articles 9 and 12 of the ICCPR (see Submission, note 
2, para. 37(1)(c)). 
169 For instance, article 111(1) provides that the hot pursuit may be undertaken “when the competent authorities 
have good reason to believe that the [foreign] ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State”.  
170 Submission, note 2 at paras 32-33. 
171  Request, note 8. 
172 LOSC, article 290(5). 




In light of the Russian Federation’s rejection of arbitration in this specific case, it did not 
come as a surprise that it informed the ITLOS that it did not intend to participate in the 
proceedings for the prescription of provisional measures.174 The hearings on the provisional 
measures took place on 6 November 2013 and consisted of one round of pleadings by the 
Netherlands. The ITLOS issued its Order on provisional measures on 22 November 2013, 
prescribing that the Russian Federation immediately release the Arctic Sunrise and the 
detained crew upon the posting of a bond or other financial security of € 3,600,000 by the 
Netherlands and that the Russian Federation ensure that the Arctic Sunrise and the persons 
that had been detained would be allowed to leave the territory and maritime areas under its 
jurisdiction.175 The operative paragraph of the Order was adopted by a majority of 19 to 2, 
with judges Golitsyn and Kulyk voting against.176 
 
Before being able considering the issue of provisional measures, the ITLOS had to establish 
that the arbitral tribunal prima facie had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. A first 
point in this respect concerned the reliance of the Russian Federation on its declaration 
excluding law enforcement measures from compulsory dispute settlement procedures. The 
Tribunal not only took note of the statements of the Netherlands, but also referred to the text 
of Russian Federation’s declaration upon ratification of the LOSC.177 In that declaration, the 
Russian Federation had also observed that it believed that declarations that were not in 
accordance with articles 309 and 310 of the LOSC – these articles imply that reservations and 
exceptions are only allowed to the extent that they are permitted by the LOSC and that 
declarations cannot modify or exclude the legal effect of the LOSC – cannot exclude or 
modify the legal effect of the provisions of the LOSC.178 The Tribunal then concluded, taking 
into account this observation, that the Russian Federation’s declaration prima facie only 
excluded disputes under article 297(2) and (3).179 In this way the ITLOS provided an 
interpretation of the Russian Federation’s declaration that was in accordance with articles 309 
and 310 of the LOSC and the Russian Federation’s declaration on those articles. This implied 
that a dispute covered by the exception to article 297(1), which refers to the freedom of 
navigation and on which the Netherlands relied, was not excluded by the Russian declaration. 
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The Order also discussed the consequences of the non-participation of the Russian Federation 
in the proceedings.180 The Order observes that this non-participation does not constitute a bar 
to prescribing provisional measures and notes that the Russian Federation was given ample 
opportunity to present its views, but did not do so.181 The ITLOS also confirmed that a non-
appearing state remains a party to the proceedings and is bound by the ensuing decision.182 
After spelling out these consequences for the Russian Federation, the Tribunal considered the 
impact of the non-appearance on the Tribunal’s consideration of the facts and the law. The 
Tribunal observed that the fact that the Russian Federation had been given ample opportunity 
to present its views, but had declined to do so made it more difficult “to evaluate the nature 
and scope of the respective rights of the Parties to be preserved by provisional measures.”183 
To avoid that the Netherlands would be put at a disadvantage by this state of affairs, the 
Tribunal decided to “identify and assess the respective rights of the Parties involved on the 
best available evidence.”184 A number of the separate opinions to the Order also were critical 
of the Russian Federation for its non-appearance.185 
In order to make the determination that the arbitral tribunal prima facie had jurisdiction, the 
Order first considers whether there existed a dispute between the Netherlands and the Russian 
Federation concerning the interpretation or application of the LOSC.186 As article 279 of the 
Convention indicates, only disputes of this nature can be settled under the dispute settlement 
provisions of the LOSC. After considering the positions of the parties, the ITLOS concluded 
that they had different views on a number of provisions of the LOSC concerned with coastal 
flag state jurisdiction and that this implied a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the LOSC.187 The Tribunal also concluded that the provisions invoked by the 
Netherlands provided a basis for jurisdiction and since it was not required to definitively 
establish the rights of the Netherlands at this stage of the proceedings, the ITLOS concluded 
that the arbitral tribunal prima facie had jurisdiction.188 This conclusion was challenged by 
Judge Golitsyn in his dissenting opinion.189 Golitsyn in this connection considered the 
implications of the right of hot pursuit that exists under article 111 of the LOSC and argued 
that the factual accounts provided by Greenpeace and the Russian authorities provided 
sufficient grounds to conclude that the Russian Coast Guard vessel Ladoga was carrying out a 
hot pursuit. Consequently, the Russian Federation “acted in full conformity with the 
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Convention”.190 As Golitsyn also indicated, the only logical conclusion to draw from the 
Russian Federation acting in accordance with article 111 would be that there was no basis to 
assert that it had infringed the freedom of navigation enjoyed by the Netherlands, as that 
freedom in this case did not exist.191 As a consequence, the ITLOS “wrongly conclude[d] that 
the arbitral tribunal, to be constituted, would have prima facie jurisdiction”.192  
As was argued above, the question whether or not the Russian Federation acted in accordance 
with article 111 of the LOSC is probably the most fundamental issue in dealing with the 
arbitration between the Netherlands and the Russian Federation. As Judge Golitsyn’s 
argument illustrates, it is also a key element in determining whether the arbitral tribunal will 
have jurisdiction. 
An assessment of the law and available facts indicates that Judge Golitsyn’s conclusion on the 
implications of article 111 for prescribing provisional measures is questionable. As was set 
out above, contrary to what he asserts, the available information rather seems to indicate  that 
the Russian authorities interrupted the hot pursuit, if it was indeed initiated from the safety 
zone of the Prirazlomnaya. In view of this uncertainty, concluding that the Russian 
Federation had acted in accordance with article 111 would have required going into the merits 
of the case, something that is beyond the remit of the ITLOS in indicating provisional 
measures. The only possible conclusion was that there exists a dispute concerning this matter 
between the parties, just as is the case for the other provisions of the LOSC mentioned by the 
ITLOS and to uphold the prima facie jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. It is somewhat of a 
missed opportunity that the ITLOS refrained from considering the implications of article 111 
in its Order. As was pointed out above, the Netherlands in its oral pleadings had put this 
matter before the Tribunal, as it had raised the question as to whether the Russian Federation 
could successfully rely on article 111 of the LOSC in an arbitration. By not ruling on this 
critical issue in determining the existence of prima facie jurisdiction, the ITLOS opened the 
door for the criticism that its Order was not well-founded in the facts and the law. 
Before moving to the indication of provisional measures, the Tribunal also considered the 
implications of article 283(1) of the LOSC, which provides that: 
When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall proceed 
expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by 
negotiation or other peaceful means.  
The Tribunal noted that there had been diplomatic correspondence between the parties and 
that the Dutch and Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs had discussed the matter a number of 
times.193 The Tribunal attached significant weight to the fact that the Netherlands in its 
request for provisional measures had indicated that in its view “[t]he possibilities to settle the 
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dispute by negotiation or otherwise have been exhausted”.194 Referring to its case law, the 
Tribunal observed that a party in those circumstances was not required to continue an 
exchange of views and consequently held that article 283 had been complied with.195 This 
conclusion was criticized by Judge Golitsyn in his dissenting opinion, who concluded that 
since the conditions of article 283 had not been fulfilled, the ITLOS should have concluded 
that the submission of the dispute to arbitration was inadmissible and should have declined to 
prescribe provisional measures.196 Golitsyn pointed out that only in a diplomatic note of 1 
October 2013 the Russian Federation had indicated the provisions of the LOSC on which it 
relied to justify the legality of its actions. The Netherlands in a note of 3 October 2013 
rejected this justification. According to Golitsyn this crystalized the dispute. As the 
Netherlands already started the arbitral procedure on the following day, it had not complied 
with its obligation under article 283(1) of the LOSC.197 
It can be doubted whether Judge Golitsyn’s conclusion on the relevance of article 283 at this 
state of the proceedings is justified. In diplomatic correspondence prior to 1 October 2013, the 
Netherlands had already indicated legal grounds on which it considered the boarding and 
arrest of the Arctic Sunrise illegal, and although there was no explicit reference to the LOSC 
in this connection, the legal arguments advanced by the Netherlands (and the Russian 
Federation) cannot but have their basis in the LOSC. In addition, the fact that two notes of the 
Netherlands remained unanswered198 should also be taken into account in considering the 
fulfilment of the obligation contained in article 283. Judge Golitsyn’s conclusion also seems 
at odds with the reliance by the ITLOS on its jurisprudence on the significance of the view of 
the individual party whether the possibilities of article 283 have been exhausted.199 Most 
importantly, as this discussion also indicates, it should be clear that it was reasonable for the 
ITLOS to consider that the requirement of article 283 prima facie had been met. As was 
pointed out by Judge Anderson in a declaration appended to the order, it will be on the arbitral 
tribunal to fully consider the implications of article 283.200 
The ITLOS indicated two closely related provisional measures. Upon the posting of a bond or 
other financial security of € 3,600,000 by the Netherlands, the Russian Federation was 
required to immediately release the Arctic Sunrise and all detained persons; and upon the 
posting of the security the Russian Federation was to ensure that the vessel and detainees were 
allowed to leave its territory and maritime zones.201 
 
The ITLOS in indicating provisional measures concluded that the urgency of the 
circumstances of the case required the prescription of provisional measures.202 In making this 
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assessment, the Tribunal took into account the period in which the Annex VII Tribunal would 
not yet be in a position to consider this issue while referring to its case law, and referred to the 
Dutch arguments to substantiate that there was urgency in the present case.203 The Tribunal 
paid scant attention to the question how the indicated measures would preserve the respective 
rights of the parties. Judge Golitsyn argued that the provisional measures as a matter of fact 
did not preserve the rights of the Russian Federation.204 At first sight, this criticism might 
seem to be justified. The arbitral tribunal could conclude that the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise 
and its crew were in accordance with the LOSC. In that case the Netherlands could be ordered 
to return the Arctic Sunrise and the former detainees to the Russian Federation and the 
Russian Federation would be entitled to take measures against the vessel and the crew. If the 
Netherlands would not be willing or able to comply with that judgment, e.g. because the 
detainees would no longer be under its jurisdiction, it would forfeit the bond or other financial 
security. To the extent that other than pecuniary sanctions might be imposed by a national 
procedure in the Russian Federation, this forfeiture would not fully maintain the Russian 
Federation’s rights. However, in assessing this point it should also be taken into account that 
if the position of the Netherlands were to be accepted by the tribunal, the detention of the 
Arctic Sunrise and its crew would have been illegal from the start. In that light the provisional 
measures of the ITLOS can certainly be said to have struck a reasonable balance.  
 
Judges Golitsyn and Jesus in their opinions appended to the Order submitted that the release 
of a vessel could only be ordered in accordance with article 292 of the LOSC.205 Under the 
LOSC the procedure for the prompt release of vessels is only envisaged in cases involving the 
enforcement by the coastal state of its fisheries legislation in the exclusive economic zone or 
the enforcement of that state’s legislation relating to vessel source pollution and dumping in 
its maritime zones,206 However, it would seem that the fact that prompt release is envisaged as 
a procedure that can be invoked by the flag state in certain specified cases does not preclude 
the ITLOS or another court or tribunal from ordering the prompt release of a vessel as a 
provisional measure in other instances if it considers this “appropriate under the 
circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute”.207 
 
On 2 December 2013, the Netherlands informed the ITLOS and the Russian Federation that it 
had complied with the condition for the release of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew.208 The 
Russian Federation has not complied with the measures it was requested to take after this step 
                                                 
203 Ibid., paras 85 and 87, 
204 Opinion Golitsyn, note 189190 at paras 45-47. 
205 Opinion Golitsyn, note 189190 at paras 48-49; separate opinion of Judge Jesus 
(www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Order/C22_Ord_22.11.2013_sep.op.Jesus_orig_Eng
.pdf), para. 7.  
206 See LOSC, articles 73, 226 and 292. 
207 Ibid., article 292. 
208 See Report on compliance with the provisional measures prescribed by the Tribunal on 22 November 2013 in 





by the Netherlands.209 The crew of the Arctic Sunrise was released as part of an amnesty in 
connection with the 20th anniversary of the Russian constitution in December 2013. The bill 
introduced in the State Duma was amended at the last moment to include the charges that had 
been brought against the crew members.210 The Arctic Sunrise itself presently is still held in 
the port of Murmansk. In March of 2014, all crew members of the Arctic Sunrise lodged an 
application with the ECtHR alleging among others that their rights under articles 5 and 10 of 
the ECHR had been breached.211 
 
Conclusions 
An assessment of the Arctic Sunrise incident from the perspective of international law 
requires looking into both the law of the sea and human rights law. Although the focus of the 
arbitration process has been to a very large measure on the law of the sea, human rights law is 
of critical importance in considering the legality of the actions of the crew of the Artic Sunrise 
and the Russian authorities. Interestingly, as was set out above the present analysis suggests 
that human rights law would probably have left the Russian authorities ample opportunity to 
take measures to prevent the actions of the Arctic Sunrise directed at the Prirazlomnaya. 
However, in light of the Russian Federation’s approach to the freedom of expression and 
assembly it should probably not come as a surprise that the Russian Federation at no time 
attempted to frame the issue in the light of articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR.212 
 
An outcome of the arbitration that has been started by the Netherlands could be that the arrest 
of the Arctic Sunrise was a breach of the LOSC. This conclusion, which subscribes the Dutch 
view that the boarding and detention of the Arctic Sunrise were not in accordance with the 
relevant international legal framework, might seem to be unsatisfactory from the perspective 
of the substantive law. The crew of the Arctic Sunrise has clearly acted contrary to provisions 
of the LOSC and it is likely that their specific action need not be tolerated from a human 
rights law perspective. The Russian Federation would be justified in taking measures against 
the crew and the vessel while they were under its jurisdiction. If there would have been no 
doubt that the Russian authorities had complied with article 111 of the LOSC, the reliance on 
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the Netherlands on the freedom of navigation would have been unconvincing and the 
Netherlands in that case might not have started an arbitration. Put differently, it could be 
argued that points of procedure prevented the Russian Federation from protecting its 
substantive rights in its exclusive economic zone. On closer consideration, this argument is 
unpersuasive. The procedural requirements in article 111 are carefully drafted to ensure that 
the balance of rights between the coastal state and the international community is maintained. 
Moreover, the facts of the case indicate that the Russian Federation had every opportunity to 
act in accordance with article 111 and protect its rights. This point is confirmed by the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Golitsyn to the Order of the ITLOS on provisional measures. The 
opinion points to the significance of article 111 and does not suggest that this right in any way 
should be expanded.213 
 
The refusal of the Russian Federation to accept arbitration and to participate in the 
proceedings on provisional measures before the ITLOS might, together with the refusal of 
China to participate in a LOSC Annex VII arbitration initiated by the Philippines earlier in 
2013, suggest that the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the Convention are under 
strain. However, cases of non-appearance have happened in the past in international litigation 
without substantially affecting the system as such. Moreover, in view of the fact that both 
arbitrations will go ahead in any case and the impact they may eventually have is difficult to 
predict at present, one should be careful in drawing conclusions in this respect. 
 
The Russian Federation has not taken any actions to comply with the Order of the ITLOS. 
The detention of the crew of the Arctic Sunrise attracted wide coverage and criticism from 
especially western public opinion and governments. Releasing the crew of the Arctic Sunrise 
under an amnesty law did allow the Russian Federation to extricate itself from this thorny 
issue without giving the impression of budging on its decision to reject arbitration and the 
proceedings before the ITLOS. 
 
The real reasons for the Russian Federation’s refusal to accept the arbitration are not known. 
The only reason that has been officially provided – the declaration of the Russian Federation 
upon ratifying the Convention – is unconvincing. The Convention indicates that non-
appearance is not the appropriate step in case a state considers that another state has no legal 
basis to start a compulsory dispute settlement procedure. In the present case, the Russian 
Federation could have invoked its declaration to contest the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal 
in preliminary proceedings or could have relied on the procedure of article 294 of the LOSC. 
In both cases success would probably have been unlikely. Possibly, the Russian Federation 
might have had more success in arguing that the Netherlands had not complied with its 
obligation to exchange views as is required by article 283 of the LOSC. One reason why the 
Russian Federation may have decided to refrain from participating in the arbitration is that its 
enforcement authorities seem to have mishandled the incident on more than one count. First, 
the Russian Coast Guard could have acted in a manner that would have left no doubt that the 
                                                 




arrest had been carried out in accordance with article 111 of the LOSC on hot pursuit. 
Secondly, the varying charges against the Arctic Sunrise and its crew suggest that the Russian 
authorities were ill-prepared to deal with this matter. The charge of piracy, that is difficult to 
square with the definition of piracy under international law, as a matter of fact completely 
backfired. It allowed Greenpeace to present itself as the innocent victim of a state that was 
flouting the law, while it should be clear that in reality the Russian Federation had good 
grounds to take measures against the Arctic Sunrise.  
 
The conclusion of the ITLOS that the arbitral tribunal would have prima facie jurisdiction is 
reasonable in the circumstances of the case and its provisional measures strike a balance in 
preserving the rights of the parties. The reasoning of the ITLOS might have been reinforced in 
a number of specific instances. As the dissenting opinion of Judge Golitsyn indicates, the 
Order left room to question a number of critical points. In particular in the light of the non-
appearance of the Russian Federation it would have been preferable from the perspective of 
upholding the integrity of Part XV of the LOSC if the Order would have left as little room as 
possible to provide the Russian Federation with arguments that its course of action was 
justified.  
